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ARGUMENT

I.

A. The McGill Cause 0f Action

is

Separate and Distinct from the

Dram Shop Cause

0f Action

Defendant Fat Smitty’s prevailed on
to this appeal, entirely

its

motion for summary judgment, Which gave

on a strawman argument. In

rise

their Complaint, the Fells pled a negligence

cause 0f action based on the duty and proximate cause elements outlined in McGill

v.

Frasure.1

Rather than attacking the Fells’ case based 0n the McGill cause 0f action, Fat Smitty’s has

argued that the Fells pled a
failed t0

prevail

Dram Shop Act

cause 0f action, and have argued that the Fells have

meet the requirements 0f the Dram Shop Act because

0n

that

it

was

argument than an attack on the McGill cause of action

Fat Smitty’s second strategy has been t0 conﬂate the

causes of action,

when

easier for Fat Smitty’s t0

that the Fells actually pled.

Dram Shop Act and

the

McGill

they are two separate causes 0f action With separate duty and proximate

cause elements. Fat Smitty’s has then argued that because one 0f the required elements 0f the

Dram Shop Act

(intoxication)

McGill cause of action

ﬂawed

is

is

also part of the factual scenario of the case-at-bar, then the

distinguishable and not applicable t0 the present case. This

reasoning. Intoxication

is

is

also

not an element of the McGill cause of action. Therefore

its

presence (or lack thereof) cannot act to bar the Fells from successfully pleading and proving a

McGill cause of action.

1

McGill

v.

Frasure, 117 Idaho 598, 790 P.2d 379 (Ct. App. 1990). See also R. pp.10-11 (Complaint

(Plaintiffs allege “Fat Smitty’s

owed

at 111118-22)

a duty 0f care to the Fells under Idaho law... to exercise reasonable care to

protect the Fells from reasonably foreseeable injury at the hands 0f other patrons 0f the Bar” and that Fat Smitty’s

knew

known

that LaDonna Hall was a dangerous individual” and that “Fat Smitty’s breached its duty
warn
them 0f the danger that LaDonna posed” and that “Fat Smitty’s breached its duty to
by
the Fells by failing to properly train its agents 0r employees” and that Fat Smitty’s breached its duty to the Fells by
failing to remove her from the premises.”

0r should have

to the Fells

failing to
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1

Fat Smitty’s third strategy has been t0 isolate certain phrases 0f the Idaho
to argue that

Idaho

Dram Shop Act

because intoxication was part 0f the factual scenario in the present case, then the

Dram Shop Act

cause of action (and

present case. (Respectfully, this

is

also

its

Where the

requirements and limitations) applies to the
district court erred).

This

is

an error because

Idaho law requires that statutes be construed as a Whole?

Because of the conﬂation 0f the two causes 0f action by both the Defendant and the
district court, this

Reply Brief Will ﬁrst outline the history 0f the cause of action

Dram Shop Act codiﬁed
Then

t0

show

the distinct elements of the

different than the cause 0f action

its

distinct elements

and Where

law they are rooted.

in Idaho

McGill cause of action will be addressed

codiﬁed in the Idaho

that the Idaho

to

show

Dram Shop Act and t0 show

that

it is

that the Fells

have met their summary judgment burden 0f proof under that cause 0f action.
1.

The Idaho Dram Shop Act codiﬁed a distinct cause 0f action and the requirements
and limitations 0f the Dram Shop Act apply only t0 that cause 0f action.

The cause 0f action codiﬁed
this

in the

cause 0f action was ﬁrst created in

the Idaho

Supreme Court held

Idaho

Dram Shop Act

is

one 0f negligence. However,

common law pursuant t0 Alegria

Payonk.

v.

for the ﬁrst time that a cause of action

may

3

In Alegria,

exist in

some

circumstances for the breach 0f the duty t0 refrain from serving alcoholic beverages t0 minors

and intoxicated persons.4 In support of its holding, the Alegria Court cited

known elements of common law

negligence that would be applicable to dram shops as to

other persons: “(1) a duty, recognized

2

Idaho Dept. ofLabor

3

Alegria

4

v.

to the following well

by law, requiring a defendant

v. Sunset Marts, Inc.
140 Idaho 207, 21
Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980).
,

Id.
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1,

t0

conform

91 P.3d 1111, 1115 (2004).

all

t0 a certain

standard 0f conduct; (2) a breach 0f that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant’s

conduct and the resulting

injuries;

and

damage.”5

(4) actual loss 0r

While there are obviously four elements

to negligence cause

of action, the Idaho

Shop Act addresses only the proximate cause element. See Idaho Dept. ofLabor
Inc. (“Sunset

duty.”).6

It

Marts”) (“The

Dram Shop Act

was not necessary

because the Idaho

for the Idaho

Dram Shop Act

0f alcoholic beverages; rather

some

respects.

stated purpose

See Slade
is

v.

addresses proximate cause, not duty 0r breach 0f

Dram Shop Act

to address duty

was
a.

common

Smith’s

t0 limit certain

“[a]ny person

Management Corp,

dram shop and

(“Slade”) (holding that the “statute’s

social host liability”

is

who

found in both

statute

intoxicated persons

who

is

8

liability existed at the

time the

are rooted in statute

and

common law.

and

common

law. Idaho

Code

23-605 provides that

§

is

spirits,

intoxicated 0r apparently intoxicated shall be guilty 0f a

to refrain

from furnishing alcoholic beverages

t0

provided in Idaho Code § 23-605 pursuant to the principles 0f negligence

The Court explained

in Slade, “it is well-settled

law reaching

far

Id., citing to Alegria, 101 Idaho at 619, 619 P.2d at 137.
Idaho Dept. ofLabor v. Sunset Marts, Inc. 140 Idaho 207, 21 1, 91 P.3d 1111, 1115 (2004).
Slade v. Smith ’s Management Corp, 119 Idaho 482, 489-90, 808 P.2d 401, 408-09 (1989).
Id. 119 Idaho at 489; 808 P.2d at 408.
,

7

that the “limiting

0r dispenses of any alcohol beverage, including distilled

sells, gives,

misdemeanor.” Slade held that the duty

6

and

further explained that the duty prohibiting the negligent furnishing of

beer or wine, t0 another person

5

had

law, and afﬁrmatively limited the cause of action in

The dutV and breach 0f duty elements

alcohol beverages

se.8

that

passed.”).7

The Slade Court

per

and breach of duty

codiﬁed certain portions 0f the cause 0f action

language necessarily recognized that dram shop and social host
statute

Sunset Marts,

did not create the cause of action for the negligent furnishing

it

previously been created by Idaho

v.

Dram
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back

in time that

Violation of a statue

is

negligence per se” and that “the effect 0f establishing negligence per se

through Violation 0f a statute
action in negligence.”9

When

to conclusively establish the ﬁrst

is

a plaintiff has proven the elements of negligence per se then “[the

negligence] elements [0f] (duty and breach) are ‘taken

become

established

plaintiff. ..”10
.

upon proof

Because the

that the Violation

plaintiffs in

away from

of the

the jury’”

statute

and

“[1]iability

may

caused the injuries of the

Slade had established that the defendant violated a statute

and thus met the elements of duty and breach 0f duty pursuant
se, the

two elements of a cause of

to the doctrine

Slade Court found that the plaintiffs could take the issue 0f social host

of negligence per

liability t0 trial

and

“introduce evidence, pro and con, as t0 causation and damages.”

The Slade Court
intoxicated persons

is

the previous ruling in

also

found that the duty

also rooted in Idaho

common

Meade

that

v.

Freeman

intoxicants cannot be a proximate cause 0f

reversing

had held

damage

0f intoxicants to drivers

and highways?” Alegria held

that

from serving alcoholic beverages

t0

law. Slade explained that Alegria overturned

Meade, the Alegria Court “addressed the

relative t0 the providing

streets

t0 refrain

that “as a matter

t0 a third

person?“

0f law the vending 0f
(Italics in original). In

applicability 0f plain, ordinary negligence

who

will

be operating

“one owes the duty

t0

their vehicles

0n the

every person in our society t0

use reasonable care to avoid injury t0 the other person in any situation in which

it

could be

reasonably anticipated 0r foreseen that a failure t0 use such care might result in such injury?“

The

Alegrz'a Court also held, “[w]e perceive

intoxicants

9

n0 justiﬁcation

for excusing the licensed

from the above general duty which each person owes

all

others in our society?”

Id.

1°
11

12
13

14

Id.

404, citing Meade

Id.,

119 Idaho

at

485; 808 P.2d

Id.,

119 Idaho

at

487; 808 P.2d at 406.

at

Id.
Id.
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v.

vendor 0f

Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d 54 (1969).

The Slade Court found

it

“”signiﬁcant that in the seminal Idaho case 0f Alegria

v.

Payonk, 101

Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980), the Court relied equally upon the duty 0f every person in our
society t0 prevent foreseeable injuries t0 others and

b.

The Idaho Dram Shop Act codiﬁed

Although Idaho Code

§

upon the duty created by

statute.”

the cause 0f action created in Alegria.

23-605 (making

a

it

misdemeanor

t0 furnish alcohol beverages to

an intoxicated person) was ﬁrst passed in 1939, there was no negligence cause of action available
to a third-party

because

person injured by an intoxicated individual to sue the vendor of the intoxicants

common law

held that

“it

is

the consumption of intoxicants that constitutes the

proximate cause of damage t0 third parties resulting from the tortious 0r unlawful acts 0f the

consumer and

cause?“

show

vending 0f intoxicants

that the

A negligence

is

cause 0f action could not

too remote t0 be considered a proximate

lie

against a tortfeasor if a plaintiff could not

a proximate cause of damages. However, Alegria overruled

Meade and

held that the

vending 0f intoxicants can in some circumstances be the proximate cause of damages t0 third
parties.“

The Idaho Dram Shop Act was a

direct response t0 Alegria. In the

the statute, the Idaho legislature stated that

alcoholic beverages that

it

agreed With

Meade

“that

the proximate cause 0f injuries inﬂicted

is

it is

opening sentence of
not the furnishing 0f

by intoxicated persons.”

However, the Idaho Dram Shop Act did not abrogate Alegria. Rather the Idaho Dram Shop Act
“recognized and

left intact”

alcoholic beverages

15

may

the

main premise of

the Alegria decision that “the furnishing 0f

constitute a proximate cause 0f injuries inﬂicted

Sunset Marts Ina, 140 Idaho 207, 210, 91 P.3d 1111, 1114 (2004), citing

Meade

v.

by

intoxicated

Freeman, 93 Idaho

at

389,

392, 462 P.2d 54, 57 (1969).
16

Sunset Marts Ina, 140 Idaho 207, 210, 91 P.3d 1111, 1114 (2004), citing Alegria, 101 Idaho

139.
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at

621, 619 P.2d at

persons under the [certain] circumstances” further outlined in the statute.” Consequently, the

Idaho

Dram Shop Act codiﬁed What was

already a distinct cause 0f action

shop/social host (1) had a statutory duty under Idaho

Code

§

—

dram

that a

23-605 t0 refrain from furnishing

alcohol to intoxicated persons (and had a general duty to use reasonable care to avoid foreseeable
injury t0 other persons); (2) that a Violation 0f Idaho

Code

§

23-605 would be a breach of that

duty (as would a failure to use reasonable care); (3) that the furnishing 0f alcoholic beverages
to

may

persons

intoxicated

constitute

a

proximate

cause

under

of injuries

certain

circumstances; and (4) that a plaintiff could have actual loss 0r damages thereby.

While the Idaho Dram Shop Act
social host liability,” the Slade

certain

I.C. §

dram shop and

23—8080)

liability.

That

is

is

stated that

purpose was t0 “limit dram shop and

its

Court held that the Idaho

Dram

social host liability.” (Bold added).

Shop’s “stated purpose

The Slade’s Court

correct because the statute certainly does not limit

why

is t0

limit

interpretation 0f

ALL dram

shop and social

Subsection (1) states that “the furnishing 0f alcoholic beverages

may

[but

not always] constitute a proximate cause 0f injuries inﬂicted by intoxicated persons under
[certain]

circumstances”

Dram Shop

— which

certain circumstances are set forth in subsection (3).

Act’s statement that the furnishing 0f alcoholic beverages

proximate cause 0f injuries”

is

also an

acknowledgement

that there is a

“may

The Idaho

constitute a

cause of action for the

breach of the duty to refrain from serving intoxicated persons — but only under the certain
circumstances outlined (and limited) by the

Dram Shop Act

does

it

state, as

statute. It is

when

nowhere

may be

in the

Idaho

Whenever

a

a proximate cause 0f injuries

—

Fat Smitty’s argues, that that the statute applies

social host/dram shop’s furnishing 0f alcoholic beverages

even

signiﬁcant that

the plaintiff has alleged a breach 0f a different duty 0f care by the tavernkeeper

with a different proximate cause 0f injuries.
17

See Slade

v.

Smith

’s

Management Corp, 119 Idaho 482,
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490, 808 P.2d 401, 409 (1991); Idaho

Code

§

23-808.

The Dram Shop Act requirements and

c.

limitations apply onlv t0 the cause 0f action

it

codiﬁed.

This statutory and case law history evidences that the requirements and limitations within
the Idaho

Dram Shop Act

apply only t0 the distinct cause 0f action ﬁrst created in Alegria

vendors of intoxicants that furnish alcohol to already intoxicated individuals

by those intoxicated persons. Indeed,

third parties that are injured

Code

§

23-808(5) provides that “n0 claim or cause 0f action

in

its

may be

—

that

liable to

plain language, Idaho

may be

brought under this

section” unless plaintiffs comply with the 180-day notice provision. The “cause 0f action” that

codiﬁed and addressed

“this section”

is

the cause 0f action created

by Alegria with

the distinct

elements stated above.

Contrary t0 Fat Smitty’s position, the Idaho
other cause 0f action that

may

lie

against a

dram shop 0r

a premise liability cause 0f action against a

some physical condition on

may be

(it

0n the

land).

to

social host. Indeed, a plaintiff may

for failure t0

may even be

have

keep the premises safe from

And

the

a but not the proximate case of injuries t0 third

an intoxicated person that destroys property or creates the dangerous condition

However, the Idaho Dram Shop Act 180-day notice provision would not apply

such a premise

duty

dram shop

does not address 0r limit any

the land (such as ice 0r any other dangerous condition).

furnishing 0f alcoholic beverages

parties

Dram Shop Act

liability

cause of action

keep and maintain

plaintiff could

its

— because

premises safe for

its

the

t0

dram shop would have an independent

invitees. In

0r does plead a cause 0f action under the Idaho

such circumstances the fact that a

Dram Shop Act —

alleging that the

dram shop’s furnishing 0f alcohol beverages was a proximate cause 0f her damages because an
intoxicated person destroyed property that created the dangerous condition that injured the
plaintiff —

dram shop

would not eliminate 0r
t0

conform

limit the separate premise liability cause of action requiring the

t0 a certain standard

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF — Page 7

0f care by maintaining

its

premises safe for invitees.

This

is

consistent With the Sunset

Marts holding

that “that there

can be more than one

proximate cause 0f injury?” In the above hypothetical the furnishing 0f alcoholic beverages

may be

a proximate cause 0f injury, but an additional proximate cause 0f injury

may be

shop’s failure to maintain the premises safe. The two potential proximate causes

the

may be

dram

pleaded

under two causes of action Where one does not rule out the other.
2.

McGill and Jones created a separate and distinct cause of action
the cause 0f action codiﬁed in the Idaho Dram Shop Act.

Similarly, the cause of action that

against

Act.

dram shops

that is independent

The cause 0f

tavernkeeper t0

its

action created

McGill and Jones outline

a separate cause of action

from the cause 0f action codiﬁed by the Idaho Dram Shop

by

the

McGill and Jones cases creates a duty for the

patrons “t0 exercise reasonable care t0 protect them from reasonably

foreseeable injury at the hands 0f other patrons” 0n

harm

is

that is not related to

t0 another patron is foreseeable

when

its

premises.” Under McGill, the risk of

the tavernkeeper

“knew 0r should have known 0f the

dangerous propensity 0f a particular patron?” This cause of action has different elements than
the cause of action codiﬁed in the

t0 refrain

from serving alcohol

Dram Shop

is

Act because

different

it

It

does not mention the duty of a tavernkeeper

to intoxicated individuals.

0f alcohol t0 intoxicated persons that
of action

Act.

may be

It

does not

state that

the proximate cause 0f injuries.

and a separate cause of action than

it is

The McGill cause

that outlined in the Idaho

ﬁrst creates a duty for the tavernkeeper t0 actively “protect”

foreseeable injury (as opposed t0 the

Dram Shop Act

the furnishing

its

Dram Shop

patrons from

duty to simply refrain from serving

intoxicated persons alcohol). Second, McGill states that the proximate cause 0f injuries

18

Sunset Marts, 140 Idaho 207, 21

1,

may

arise

91 P.3d 1111, 1115 (2004).

19

McGill v. Frasure, 117 Idaho 598, 601, 790 P.2d 379, 380 (Ct. App. 1990); Jones v. Stames, 150 Idaho 257, 245
P.3d 1009 (2011).
20
McGill v. Frasure, 117 Idaho 598, 601, 790 P.2d 379, 382 (Ct. App. 1990), citing Nevin v. Carlasco, 139 Mont.
512, 3 65 P.2d 637 (1961).
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from the

fact that the

dram shop knew 0r should have known of the dangerous propensity 0f a

— and

particular patron

failed t0 use reasonable care t0 protect

McGill cause 0f action creates dram shop

Whereas the Idaho Dram Shop
injured

by an

knowing

creates

intoxicated person to

was already

the person

Neither the

liability

dram shop

Whom

the

by

applies t0 the

liability relating t0

dram shop’s

patrons.

any third party

that is

alcoholic beverages,

intoxicated.

district court

the

it

dram shop furnished alcohol

nor Fat Smitty’s have cited t0 law that applies the 180-day

notice provision for the cause 0f action codiﬁed

action created

only as

patrons. Additionally, the

its

by

the Idaho

Dram Shop Act

McGill and Jones common law. Fat Smitty’s

to the cause

tries t0 distinguish

0f

McGill and

Jones from the present case by stating that those cases did not involve intoxication. However,

McGill and Jones d0 not discuss intoxication because intoxication
McGill/Jones cause of action. (And

Jones

may

Idaho

Dram Shop Act

or

may

we

therefore do not

is

know whether an

(intoxication)

is

or

may

McGill cause of
lies

action, intoxication likely Will

knows

tavernkeeper’s duty t0 exercise reasonable care.

from reasonably foreseeable injury
intoxicated.

A

be part of the

or reasonably ought t0

at the

Dram Shop Act

many

against tavernkeepers. The fact that a patron

intoxicated (if the tavernkeeper

is

McGill or

also be present in a factual scenario giving rise to

notice limitation t0 a cause of action pled under McGill. Indeed, in

cause 0f action

actor in

not have been intoxicated). The fact that one 0f the elements particular t0 the

a McGill cause 0f action does not automatically transfer and apply the

rise to a

not an element of the

A tavernkeeper has

factual scenarios giving

fact pattern as a

may become

know

180-day

this)

McGill

Violent

when

has t0 be a part 0f a

a duty t0 protect

hands 0f other patrons Whether or not

its

its

patrons

Violent patron

patron’s intoxication does not nullify or limit a tavernkeeper’s liability if he
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fails

from foreseeable injury When he knows 0f a patron’s Violent

t0 protect his patrons

propensities.

3.

A

plaintiff

may

plead multiple causes of action, and a failure under one cause 0f

action does not eliminate the other cause 0f action.

Fat Smitty’s primary argument

Act

applicable

is

is

that the determination

where

facts demonstrate the furnishing

Act

Dram Shop Act

[the

at

Idaho

Dram Shop

Idaho Code

that the statute [and

hosts

And

that “[i]f the Plaintiffs

dram shop’s furnishing 0f alcoholic beverages was a proximate case

accident, the

Dram Shop

“based 0n whether a social host/dram shop’s furnishing 0f alcoholic

is

beverages ‘may be a proximate cause 0f injuries.”’21
that the

0f whether the Idaho

§

of alcoholic beverages
Act]

applicable.”22

is

may be

0f injuries, or

a proximate cause of the

However, a plain reading 0f Idaho

23-808 shows that nowhere does

it

state, as

limitations] applies in all causes 0f action against

its

[sic]

have alleged

Fat Smitty’s alleges,

dram shops and

where the furnishing of alcoholic beverages may be a proximate cause 0f injuries.

As emphasized

in

states that the furnishing

Idaho Dept. ofLabor

v.

Sunset Marts, Inc. (“Sunset Marts”), the “Act

0f alcoholic beverages ‘may constitute a proximate cause,’ not

constitute the proximate cause’ because “it has long

more than one proximate cause
Shop Act does not provide
cause of injuries,

it

0f an injury?”

that the furnishing

necessarily implies that

third party is injured

by an

more than one person

22
23

Respondent’s Brief,

‘shall

been the law in Idaho that there can be

(Italics in the original).

Because the

Dram

of alcoholic beverages constitutes the proximate

more than one cause 0f action may be alleged when a

intoxicated person.

liable for injuries (as

The multiple causes 0f

action

emphasized in Sunset Marts When

may
it

act t0 hold

held the non-

party intoxicated driver could be included on the special verdict form along with the

21

social

dram shop

p. 15.

Id.

Idaho Dept. ofLabor

v.

Sunset Marts, Inc, 140 Idaho 207, 211, 91 P.3d 1111, 1115 (2004), citing I.C. § 23-

808(1).
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an attorney fees case, Decker

was common

v.

may be

of action

that the plaintiffs sued). Or, multiple causes

Homeguard

Sys., the

alleged against the

Idaho Court 0f Appeals discussed that

practice to request relief 0r plead “multiple causes 0f action...

developed from facts and circumstances

known

at the

”24

If multiple causes

In

it

which could be

time 0f pleading” and that some 0f those

causes would be “withdrawn 0r dismissed during the pretrial stage,
are unsupportable.

same party.

when

it

develops that they

of action are alleged against a party, the dismissal of one

of the causes 0f action does not necessitate the dismissal of all causes of action against the party.

A

plaintiff

can successfully allege and prove the necessary elements 0f one cause 0f action

against a party While at the

same time

fail t0

meet

second cause 0f action against a party. However, the
are multiple) against a party does not

work

its

burden to meet the requirements of a

failure

0f one cause 0f action (when there

t0 dismiss the party entirely out

The Idaho Dram Shop Act codiﬁed (and limited

in signiﬁcant

0f the case.

ways) one possible cause

of action against a dram shop 0r social host. The law provided in McGill and Jones
outlines a second possible cause of action against

dram shops or

action have separate burdens, elements, and limitations.

plead or maintain one cause of action does not eliminate

The

social hosts.

failure

liability

v.

Stames

The two causes of

0f a plaintiff to adequately

under the other cause of action.

Idaho law adheres to simple notice pleading requirements pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil

Procedure

of

8.

Fat Smitty’s has had ample notice through the Plaintiffs’ Complaint and the process

litigation that the

Fells

were seeking

relief

Inasmuch

as the Plaintiffs

the Idaho

Dram Shop Act (however Plaintiffs have

24

Decker

v.

Homeguard Sys., a

through the McGill/Jones cause of action.

Complaint could be construed to also include a cause 0f action under

Div. oflntermountain

1983).
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Gas

never maintained that

it

does nor that they are

C0,, 105 Idaho 158, 160, 666 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Ct. App.

in fact pursuing

for

an Idaho

summary judgment t0

Dram Shop

cause of action),

it

dismiss that one cause 0f action

would be grounds

— not an

motion

for a partial

entire dismissal

0f the case.

Defendant argues that reversing the grant of summary judgment would allow a plaintiff
to

circumvent the requirements of the Idaho

plaintiff that alleges in a cause

Dram Shop

Act. However, this

is

not the case.

0f action that a dram shop breached a duty of care by furnishing

must

alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person and thereby proximately caused his damages,

comply with

the provisions of the Idaho

Dram Shop Act

plaintiff t0 adequately plead 0r support his allegations

Shop Act

(or

even an election not

from successfully pleading

that a

to plead this cause

in all cases.

of action

dram shop breached

its

at all)

that the

it

knew

its

dram shop breached both

0r should have

injuries. It is

as t0 proximately cause the plaintiffs injuries.

duties.

Or

it

dram shop has two

may be

that the

by a

Dram

patrons from

known

not a matter 0f

a matter 0f choosing which independent and separate duty the facts

dram shop breached so

Either way, the

failure

does not prevent a Plaintiff

duty 0f care t0 protect

had Violent propensities, Which breach was a proximate cause of
It is

However, a

under the requirements 0f the Idaho

reasonably foreseeable injury at the hands 0f other patrons which

“clever” pleading.

A

It

may be

dram shop breached one and not

show

that the

the other.

separate duties and independent causes 0f action

may be

maintained by a plaintiff so long as there are facts in support 0f the distinct elements of the
particular cause 0f action that he is pleading.

point to

some

line in a

alcoholic of beverages

it

—

that if a defendant can

complaint that could be interpreted as an allegation that the furnishing of

was a proximate cause of damages, then

the 180-day notice provision 0f the Idaho

action available to

The Defendant’s suggestion

is

a “gotcha”

game

support.
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the plaintiff

must comply with

Dram Shop Act and may have n0

other causes 0f

that the simple notice pleadings rules in Idaho does not

Because the Fells have sufﬁciently pled and supported the independent cause of action
found under McGill and because the 180-day notice provision under the Idaho
limited only t0 the cause 0f action that the

Dram Shop Act Codiﬁed,

Dram Shop Act

is

the Fells respectfully

request that the Court reverse the district court’s grant 0f summary judgment.

The Court should afﬁrm

B.

motion t0

The

the district court’s ruling denying the Defendant’s

strike.

denied Fat Smitty’s motion t0 strike the Afﬁdavit 0f Angela

district court correctly

Burke, and did not abuse

its

discretion.

Accordingly the Court should afﬁrm the

district court’s

ruling.

Angela Burke’s statements contain proper foundation

1.

for

summary judgment

pugposes.

In her declaration,

who made

the statements

stabbed,” which

—

that

(LaDonna

Hall).25

for the

—

was November
would put

it

26, 2016) and (“in the

in the Fall

weeks and months

26
27
28

29

prior t0 Steve being

of 2016).” Ms. Burke also provided

who, what, where and when. Defendant’s concerns
is

Ms. Burke

that

stated

Who

Who

heard Ms.

she

made her

Ms. Burke did not specify the

not well-founded. The relevant matter t0 this case

in earshot 0r to First Street

R. p. 242 (Afﬁdavit 0f Angela Burke at

is that

the statements were

Saloon employees — showing that the First Street Saloon had

knowledge 0f Ms. Hall’s dangerous

25

(First

a female First Street Saloon bartender)” Therefore, Ms. Burke laid the foundation

exact bartender

made

She identiﬁed

She provided where the statements were made

Hall’s statement (a First Street Saloon bartender)” Finally,

statement to

for her statements.

She provided when the statements were made (“around the time Steve was

Street Saloon).26

stabbed”

Ms. Burke provided proper foundation

proclivities.

1]

3).

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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Ms. Burke’s statement

that

it

was within earshot

0f an employee

is

not speculative. Whether someone

t0

testify.

Ms. Burke would have been able

is

near enough 0r a statement

to identify

Who

in the

room were

particularly because she frequented the bar often (1 to 2 times a week). There

handful of bartenders that worked

at the First Street

Defendant had ample opportunity
information regarding this matter.

Defendant

is

is

made loud

It

to

was

also

also free t0 cross—examine

Saloon

at the

depose Ms. Burke
free t0

Ms. Burke

Ms. Burke’s testimony should not be stricken

bartenders

time 0f Steve’s stabbing.”

if

it

wished

to discovery further

depose Fat Smitty’s bartenders. The

at trial

and thereby challenge her

credibility.

stage t0 avoid a

Rather, the Defendant will be free t0 challenge foundation and credibility

when Ms. Burke

at the

—

were only a

summary judgment

the stand at

may

a matter that a lay person has sufﬁcient knowledge from Which she

enough

be heard

is

trial.

takes

trial.

Angela Burke’s statements are not inadmissible hearsay.

2.

In paragraph 3 of her declaration,

she heard

LaDonna

Ms. Burke reports

that While at the First Street Saloon,

Hall say often and loudly that “she wanted t0 stab someone and didn’t care

about the consequences?“ This statement

is

not inadmissible hearsay. In Frank

v.

City 0f

Caldwell, the Idaho Supreme Court held that “[t]he hearsay rule excludes evidence 0f out-ofcourt statements only
declarant.”32

Rather,

it is

when

offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted

Ms. Hall’s statement

is

by

not being offered t0 prove the truth 0f the matter asserted.

being offered t0 show the notice that First Street Saloon had regarding Ms. Hall and

the reasonability 0f First Street Saloon’s subsequent actions given that notice.

also held that “[e]vidence 0f a statement

information that a person

30

the out-of-court

Who

is

not excludable as hearsay

heard the statement had

at the

R. p. 192 (Welker-Mate Dep., p. 41:14-18).

31

R. p. 242 (Afﬁdavit of Angela Burke at

32

Frank v.

1]

3).

City OfCaldwell, 99 Idaho 498, 499, 584 P.2d 643, 644 (1978).
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when

The Frank Court

offered t0

show

the

time 0f his 0r her subsequent

conduct, as bearing upon the reasonableness 0f that conduct.”33 In the present case, Ms. Hall’s

statement

is

being offered t0 show the information that the First Street Saloon had regarding Ms.

and whether With

Hall,

protect Mr. Fell

that information, the First Street

from foreseeable injury

Alternatively,

at the

Ms. Hall’s statement

is

Saloon exercised reasonable care to

hands 0f Ms. Hall.
an admissible exception to the rule against hearsay

under I.R.CP. 803(3), Which exception to hearsay provides:

Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, 0r Physical Condition.

(3)

declarant’s then existing state 0f

mind (such

A

statement of the

as motive, intent 0r plan) 0r emotional,

sensory, 0r physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, 0r bodily health).

Ms.

Hall, the declarant, stated both her intent (she

wanted

t0 stab

someone) and her mental

feeling (she didn’t care about the consequences). This statement of intent

front 0f a First Street Bartender

was sufﬁcient

..

and apathy made

in

notice t0 put the First Street Saloon 0n notice 0f

Ms. Hall’s dangerous propensities.
In Paragraph 4 of her Declaration,

Ms. Burke reported

that she told a female bartender at

the First Street Saloon that “the bartender needed t0 keep an eye

t0 start

Burke

ﬁghts and can be a problem

if

she

is

drunk.”34 This statement

Will be available at trial t0 testify in-person as t0 this

Street Saloon.

At

trial

it

judgment, the statement

is

will not

0n LaDonna Hall since she
is

not hearsay.

warning that she gave

First,

likes

Ms.

t0 the First

be an out-of-court statement. For purposes of summary

made by way of declaration

as proof 0f the evidence that the Plaintiff

has in support of his case.

Second, Ms. Burke’s statement
is

33

34

is

not hearsay because similar t0 Ms. Hall’s statement,

not being offered t0 prove the truth of the matter asserted. Rather

Id.

R. p. 242 (Afﬁdavit of Angela Burke at

1]
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it is

it

being offered t0 show

what information

that First Street

0n the reasonability 0f First

Saloon had

at trial 0r

acted

Accordingly, the

motion

outside

how

that bears

Defendant

is

free to cross-examine

issues.

that the district court ailed to perceive the issue as

boundaries

the

district court

to strike should

C.

issues, again, the

examine any other foundational

The Defendant has not shown
discretion,

time 0f Steve’s stabbing and

Street Saloon’s action 0r inactions.

Regarding any further foundation

Ms. Burke

at the

did not abuse

of

its

its

discretion

discretion and

or

its

failed

exercise

to

one 0f
reason.

decision 0n the Defendant’s

be afﬁrmed.

Summary Judgment

should be reversed because the Fells have produced

sufﬁcient evidence t0 create a genuine issue 0f fact 0f Whether Steve’s stabbing

was

foreseeable.

Fat Smitty’s

is

requesting that the Court afﬁrm the district court’s grant 0f

judgment on the issue 0f foreseeability. This
its

is

an issue that the

decision. Contrary t0 Fat Smitty’s argument, there

owed

a duty t0 Plaintiff Steven Fell.

It

did.

Idaho law

patrons] a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect
the hands 0f other

is

district court

summary

did not address in

n0 issue 0f whether 0r not Fat Smitty’s
is

clear that a “tavernkeeper

owes

them from reasonably foreseeable

patrons?“ “[A] tavernkeeper has a duty

t0 protect its patrons

[its

injury at

from injury by

other patrons 0n the premises.”36

Foreseeability

held in Hayes
fact

v.

is

not an element 0f duty but an element 0f proximate cause. This Court

Union Paciﬁc R. Ca,

that “[p]r0ximate cause consists

0f two

factors,

cause in

and legal responsibility.”37 The “legal responsibility element 0f proximate causation

satisﬁed if at the time of the defendant’s negligent act the Appellant’s injury

35

McGill v. Frasure, 117 Idaho 598, 601, 790 P.2d 379, 382 (Ct. App. 1990).
Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257, 260, 245 P.3d 1009, 1012 (201 1).
37
Hayes v. Union Pacific R. C0., 143 Idaho 204, 208, 141 P.3d 1073, 1077 (2006).
36
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is

was reasonably

And

foreseeable as a natural 0r probable consequence 0f the defendant’s conduct.”38

cause

proximate

an issue for the jury to decide.”

is

As shown below,

show

the Fells have produced sufﬁcient evidence to

that there is a

genuine issue 0f fact as t0 whether Steve Fell’s stabbing was foreseeable by Fat Smitty’s.
Foreseeability

1.

Under McGill,

is

a genuine issue 0f fact for the iurV t0 decide.

the risk 0f

harm

to another patron is foreseeable

“knew 0r should have known 0f the dangerous propensity 0f a
foreseeability “can

Court also discussed that
experience, a proprietor

by

which might endanger the

McGill Court did not speciﬁcally adopt 0r
the case before

it,

reject this

n0 evidence was submitted

in

test.

39

test

The

simply because in

support.“ However, Whether the second

its

is

necessary for the ﬁnal determination of

dram shop

in front

of the

tolerates disorderly

district court.“ It

conduct on

its

was an

issue that

was

raised

should be expressly adopted

premises and

fails to

provide

Id.

Id.

injury
4°

safety 0f the proprietor’s patrons.”41

the general test of foreseeability and

summary judgment pleadings

here because if a

38

based 0n past

Accordingly, the Fells request this Court to expressly adopt this general foreseeability

The present case supports

in the

that,

The McGill

the likelihood of disorderly conduct

second foreseeability

foreseeability test applies Will be a question 0f law that

this case.

the tavernkeeper

particular patron.”40

be shown by proving

knew 0f or should have recognized

third persons in general

when

(holding that “[0]n1y

was reasonably

McGill

v.

When

foreseeable

reasonable minds could

may the judge

come

to but

one conclusion as

to

Whether

[a plaintiff’s]

decide this legal responsibility issue as a matter 0f law”)

Frasure, 117 Idaho 598, 601, 790 P.2d 379, 382 (Ct. App. 1990), citing Nevin

v.

Carlasco, 139 Mont.

512, 365 P.2d 637 (1961).
41

42

Id.,

117 Idaho

See McGill

at

601, 790 P.2d at 382.

at 601, 790 P.2d at 382; see also Jones v. Stames, 150 Idaho 257, 260, 245
P.3d 1009, 1012 (2011) (stating the “[McGill] court also considered that a tavernkeeper’s knowledge 0f the
‘likelihood 0f disorderly conduct by third persons in general Which might endanger the safety 0f the proprietor’s

patrons’

may

consider, this
43

v.

Frasure, 117 Idaho

establish foreseeability of an attack

more general standard”)

See R. pp. 141-146; R. 31.
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on the premises, but

it

did not expressly adopt, or in that case even

adequate security, then

it is

foreseeable that a patron on

its

premises

may

suffer bodily

harm

at

the hands of another patron.

“Whether a

risk

0f harm

foreseeable

is

Summary judgment should be denied because
Smitty’s

knew

Smitty’s, based

by

0r should have

generally a question for the trier 0f fact.”44

there

known 0f LaDonna’s

is

a genuine issue 0f fact that (1) Fat

Hall’s dangerous propensities; and (2) Fat

0n past experiences, should have recognized the likelihood 0f disorderly conduct

third persons in general

which might endanger the

Whether Defendant knew

a.

is

that

LaDonna

safety 0f the proprietor’s patrons.

Hall had dangerous propensities

is

a genuine

issue 0f fact

Foreseeability

should have

known

is

an issue that should g0 t0 the jury because whether Fat Smitty’s knew 0r

that

LaDonna had dangerous

Angela Burke was a frequent patron
stabbed.“ Angela often observed

at

propensities

at Fat Smitty’s

LaDonna

at

she

if

is

front 0f the bartenders that she

a genuine issue of fact. First,

during the time period that Steve was

Fat Smitty’s.“ Angela warned a female bartender

Fat Smitty’s that they “needed t0 keep an eye 0n

and can be a problem

is

LaDonna

Hall since she likes t0 start ﬁghts

drunk.”47 Angela also often heard

(LaDonna) “wanted

t0 stab

LaDonna say

someone and

loudly,

and

in

didn’t care about the

consequences.”48
Fat Smitty’s further had knowledge 0f LaDonna’s dangerous propensities because Rachel

Welker-Mate, one of

LaDonna

like a sister.”

44

Orthman

45

R. p. 242 (Burk Decl.,

46

its

v.

bartenders,

On

close

enough With LaDonna

a previous occasion, Rachel had observed

Idaho Power C0,, 130 Idaho 597, 601, 944 P.2d 1360, 1364 (1997).
112).

Id.

47

R. p. 243 (Burk, Dec1., at

48

R. p. 242 (Burk Decl., at 1B).
R. p. 198 (Welker-Mate Dep., p.6425-12).

49

was

114).
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that she considered

LaDonna run

at

Pamela

LaDonna when

Hall (LaDonna’s mother) and try to choke her.” Rachel had t0 restrain

A month before

incident occurred.“

been removed from another bar
that

LaDonna had

had

tried to stab

LaDonna stabbed

after a yelling

Steve, Rachel learned that

this

LaDonna had

match with another customer.52 Rachel

told Steve

pulled a knife on another individual at another bar, the Crown, and that she

someone

Pepper Tree

at the

bar.53

Rachel also told Steve that LaDonna showed

Rachel the knife 0n the afternoon before the incident occurred.54 Rachel was aware that LaDonna

had had run-ins with the
A11 0f these facts

police,

show

had charges against

her,

and had been

that there is a genuine issue

0f fact as

in jail.55

t0

whether Fat Smitty’s had

knowledge 0f LaDonna’s dangerous propensities — but chose

speciﬁc

Consequently,

summary judgment 0n the

third persons in general

Foreseeability “can also be

knew of

is

ignore

them.

issue of foreseeability should be denied.

Whether Fat Smitty’s should have recognized

b.

t0

the likelihood 0f disorderly conduct

bV

an issue 0f fact.

shown by proving

that,

based 0n past experience, a proprietor

0r should have recognized the likelihood of disorderly conduct

by

third persons in

general which might endanger the safety 0f the proprietor’s patrons.”56

The McGill Court

also relied

upon Nevin

v.

Carlasco, which listed scenarios

when

conduct by third parties would likely endanger other patrons that would be foreseeable t0
tavernkeepers.57

Among

the speciﬁc conduct listed, the Nevin Court explained that a tavern

keeper has a duty to protect a patron from injury when: (1) a person was allowed to remain on
the premises

5°
51

when

his conduct

“had become obstreperous and aggressive

such a degree the

R. p. 199 (Welker-Mate Dep., p.66:2-4).
Id.

(Welker-Mate Dep., p.66:5 — p.67z9).

52

R. p. 200 (Welker-Mate Dep., p.7022-14).

53

R. p. 232 (Steve’s Dep., p.41:3-12).

54

R. pp. 232

55

R. p. 199 (Welker-Mate Dep., p.66:5

56

McGill

v.

& 234 (Steve’s Dep., p.41 :8-25, p.55z8-12).

Nevin

v.

— p.67:9).

Frasure, 117 Idaho 598, 601, 790 P.2d 379, 382 (Ct. App. 1990), citing Allen

356, 357 (Fla.1983) and
57

t0

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

Carlasco, 139 Mont. 512, 365 P.2d 637 (1961).
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§§ 3 14A, 344 (1965).

v.

Babrab, Ina, 438 So.2d

knew

tavern keeper

t0 stop a

0r ought t0 have

ﬁght as soon as possible

known he endangered

after

it

others”; (2) “the tavern keeper failed

started”; (3) “the tavern

keeper failed t0 provide a staff

adequate t0 police the premises”; and (4) “the tavern keeper tolerated disorderly conduct.”58

There

is

and inadequate

a genuine issue 0f fact as t0 whether Fat Smitty’s combined a lack 0f security

staff

With a general tolerance of disorderly conditions 0n

premises, and

its

Whether such policies and past experience made Steve’s stabbing foreseeable.

When

a bar 0r tavern serves alcohol as

its

principle

form 0f income,

foreseeable that there Will be aggressive and disorderly conduct from

it

is

reasonably

some patrons

that Will

endanger the safety 0f other patrons.”

There

was

is

testimony that physical ﬁghting was a regular occurrence

and

tolerated

that Fat Smitty’s did not

at

Fat Smitty’s that

have adequate security measures 0r

staff t0 prevent

Violence or keep their patrons safe. Alex “saw physical altercations between patrons inside the

bar approximately 2-3 times per week.”60
these ﬁghts.“

are t0 patrol

become

It is

He

the industry standard to

physical,

remove individuals from
of other patrons and to

frequent physical ﬁghting, the Bar did not

58

Id.,

Karaoke

139 Mont.

at

nights,

security personnel,

whose

sole duties

the premises

call

Whose

actions indicate they are a likely

law enforcement when necessary.62 Despite the

employ any bouncer or

security,

even for weekend

and other special events With larger crowds.63

515, 365 P.2d at 638 (1961).

59

R. p. 152 (Declaration 0f Fred Del

6°

R. p. 240 (Declaration 0f Alex Clawson at

61

employ trained

and survey the premises, deescalate potentially aggressive encounters before they

threat to the safety

nights,

called police for only approximately one-third 0f

Marva

at
1]

1]

11).

6).

Id)

62

R. p. 152 (Del

63

R. p. 207

Marva

Decl. at 1112).

& 210 (Radford, p.3125-8, p.42:23 — 43:4); R. pp. 217 & 219 (Klein, p.24210-16, p.32:6 — p.3321).
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It is

industry standard to provide staff

never received training from the Defendant,

and dangerous patrons or

how to

its

members with

security training.“

managers, 0r owners on

The bartenders

how t0 handle belligerent

handle altercations between patrons.“

Additionally, the Bar did not provide adequate stafﬁng to handle physical disturbances.

On

the night of the incident,

had been drinking

that

Alex was the only bartender 0n duty.“ Rachel was not 0n duty; she

evening.“ The stafﬁng of only one employee to mix drinks, serve patrons,

do dishes, and maintain security for a crowd of 20
for the

to

60 patrons does not meet industry standard

tavem—keeping business and does not show reasonable care 0r commitment

t0 the safety

0f patrons from foreseeable dangerous actions by third parties.“ Lawanna and Jack did not
provide additional support as they were also drinking that night, as was their custom.”
Fat Smitty’s failure t0 follow industry standard by training

its

staff in security measures,

employing designated security such as a bouncer, or even adequately stafﬁng the building with

more than one employee 0n

the busiest nights

reasonable care t0 protect

patrons from the foreseeable Violent actions of third parties, even

though

it

its

is

evidence that Fat Smitty’s did not exercise

had speciﬁc knowledge of the Violence of the patron

that stabbed Steve

and general

information about the frequent Violent outbreaks 0n the premises.70

Lawanna and Jack
the managers of the Bar,

contributed to the general disorderly culture at the Bar. Despite being

Lawanna and Jack

regularly frequented the

64

R. p. 152 (Del

65

R. p. 194 (Welker-Mate Dep., p.47225

66

R. 191, 195 (Welker-Mate Dep., p.37z22-24; p.53:1-2).

67

R. p. 231 (Steven’s Dep., p.36:13-15).

68

R. p. 153 (Del

69

R. pp. 209, 211 (Radford Dep., p.38:4

Marva

Marva

Decl. at

Decl. at

1]

1]

R. pp. 152

&

in the evenings,

and

13).

— p.

48:13). R. p.

240 (Clawson

Decl., at

115).

14).

—

p. 39:11, p.6724-7,

15, p.53:1-6, p.5524-15).
70

Bar

154 (Del Marva Decl. atﬂ 10
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&

18).

p.68z20-22); R. pp. 217, 220-21 (Klein Dep., p.2524-

consumed alcohol

t0 the point

kick people 0ut.”72 Jack and

of getting drunk.“ They would then “get angry,”

Lawanna would

“start

ﬁghts and

also allow their friends t0 be overserved

by mixing

drinks for their friends after a bartender had cut-off a friend.”

standard for Jack and

dangerous situations

Lawanna

arise,

it is

was a

It

clear abuse of industry

When

potentially

management

t0 assist in

to drink alcohol While at the establishment.”

natural for staff

and patrons

t0 100k t0

resolving these aggressive and emotionally complex situations.” However, the judgment 0f

management

that has

management may

been drinking, such as Jack and Lawanna, will be impaired, and such

and

escalate rather than deescalate the situation

effectiveness of the on—duty staff.” Jack and

Lawanna’s presence

may even

at the

bar 0n

its

diminish the
busiest nights

did not add t0 the staff and security at Fat Smitty’s.77

These

facts create a

that physical altercations

genuine issue 0f fact that the Bar had past experience and was aware

were a regular occurrence

adequate security. They therefore

at their

premises but failed to provide

knew of 0r should have recognized the

conduct by third persons in general Which would endanger Steve,

its

likelihood of disorderly

patron.

Rather than provide security or adequate, trained staff to protect their patrons, the Bar
clearly established a culture

When

Violence occurred.”

with a p001

71

stick.79

Where the patrons were expected

On

and others

to defend themselves

one occasion Steve defended the manager Jack, from being

Steve was not asked t0 leave on that occasion.80

R. pp. 191, 193 (Welker-Mate Dep., p.34:5

— p.3627,

p.4324-8); R. p.

227 (Audra’s Dep.,

&

p. 90:5-6);

R. pp. 208-09

220 (Klein Dep., p.25:4-15, p.53:1-6).
(Radford Dep., p.37:21-24, p.3827-14, p.3921-1 1); R. pp. 217
72
R. pp. 191, 193 (Welker-Mate Dep., p.34:5 — p.36z7, p.43:4-21); R. p. 227 (Audra’s Depo., p. 90:5-6).
73

74
75

76
77

R. p. 193 (Welker-Mate Dep., p.43222
R. p. 153 (Del

hit

Marva

Decl. at

1]

15).

Marva

Decl. at

1]

19).

— p.44:6).

Id.
Id.
Id.

78

R. p. 155 (Del

79

R. p. 224 (Klein Dep., p.74:19

8°

R. p. 233 (Steve’s Dep., pp. 51-53).

— p.75: 13);

R. p. 233 (Steve’s Dep., p.51:20
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— p.5226).

The events
security

and

that led t0 Steve’s stabbing

that the staff relied

foreseeable that a patron

would

show

0n other patrons

suffer injury at the

that there

to assist

was not adequate,

When ﬁghts occurred — making

hands of another patron.“

or should have

physically

cell

known

that their

First,

it

Fat Smitty’s

premises even

when

so disorderly and aggressive that Fat Smitty’s

knew

allowed LaDonna Hall and her mother, Pamela Hall, to remain 0n

LaDonna and Pamela’s conduct had become

trained staff 0r

its

conduct endangered others. Rachel testiﬁed that she and Alex

removed Pamela Hall from

inside the

Bar

after

Pamela

started screaming about her

phone.82 However, Rachel and Alex did not remove Pamela from the premises. Pamela

remained on the Bar porch, yelling, screaming, and pounding the door and refusing
Rachel threatened t0

call the police,

to leave.83

but she did not at that time.“ She permitted Pamela t0

remain on the premises. Furthermore, Rachel allowed another Fat Smitty’s customer, LaDonna,
to

go and handle the disorderly and aggressive conduct 0f Pamela despite knowing

that

LaDonna

and Pamela had a history of Violence towards one another and despite knowing that both

LaDonna and Pamela were extremely

intoxicated.“

Next, the highly foreseeable ﬁght ensued between

LaDonna and Pamela on

the

Bar

porch. Alex (the only on-duty bartender), Rachel (a drinking patron) and other Bar customers,

including Jason Dixon, Steve, and Audra went outside to stop the ﬁght.86 Rachel and Steve

pulled Pamela off of LaDonna.87 Jason and Alex helped

Alex did not

call the cops.

Alex and Rachel did not

instruct

and Rachel relied upon the assistance of other patrons
81

R. p. 155 (Del

82

R. pp. 196-97 (Welker-Mate Dep., p.57:16

83

84

Marva

Decl. at

1]

LaDonna

up.88

t0 stop the ﬁght.

— p.58:3).

1).

Id.

85

R. pp. 195, 197 (Welker-Mate Dep., p.50:23-25, p.51:4-8, p.52:11-12, p. 58:12-16).

86

R. p. 197 (Welker-Mate Dep., p.58220-22).

87

R. p. 197 (Welker-Mate Dep., p.58222-24).

88

R. p. 197 (Welker-Mate Dep., p.58:24).
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the ﬁght began,

everyone to stay inside. Rather, Alex

20).

R. p. 197 (Welker-Mate Dep., p.58: 10-1

When

LaDonna then punched

Audra, and Rachel began pulling Audra into the Bar.” Alex went to

Lawanna and

Jack, despite being at the

intervene

when LaDonna rushed

LaDonna again rushed
to intervene.93

Bar When the ﬁght occurred, did not

They were drinking and

the situation.”

the door

at

When

call the cops. Signiﬁcantly,

assist in

managing

socializing with their friends.” That left just Steve t0

Rachel as she was pulling Audra into the Bar.”
another bar customer again opened

Because 0f inadequate security or

it,

there

When

was only Steve

staff to handle the situation, Steve

was stabbed

with a knife.

There

is

a genuine issue 0f fact that

disorderly conduct

by

the point 0f relying

on patrons

including

patrons,

third persons

Steve.

it

was foreseeable

t0 Fat Smitty’s that a tolerance

0f

—

t0

combined with inadequate

t0 assist in physical altercations

Summary judgment should

security measures

and

— would endanger the

not

staff

safety 0f its

be afﬁrmed 0n the issue 0f

foreseeability.

2.

Steve was stabbed 0n the Defendant’s premises

Under Idaho law, “[A] tavernkeeper has a duty

t0 protect its patrons

patrons 0n the premises.”94 (bold added). Fat Smitty’s bar has a

the building.

from injury by other

wooden porch

that is attached t0

A wooden fence surrounds the porch.95 The evidence is clear that LaDonna stabbed

Steve while both were 0n Fat Smitty’s porch, within arm’s reach 0f the front d00r.96 There can

be n0 question that Fat Smitty’s porch was

its

private property, and that therefore, Steve

was

stabbed 0n Fat Smitty’s premises.

89

9°
91

92
93

94
95

R. p.197 (Welker-Mate Dep., p.59-10-13).
R. pp. 21 1-12 (Radford Dep. pp. 67-76).
Id.

R. pp. 21 1-12 (Radford Dep., p.67:4-7, p.68:20-22, p. 76); R. p. 221-22 (Klein Dep., p.55z4-15, p.60).
R. p. 230 (Steve’s Dep., p.27:24 — p.28217).

Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257, 260, 245 P.3d 1009, 1012 (2011).
(See photo 0f Fat Smitty’s building, attached as Exhibit “H” to Declaration 0f Counsel in Support 0f Opposition

Summary Judgment).

t0

Motion

96

R. pp. 230-32 (Steve Dep., p.26224

for

— p.2724;
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p.35212-17; p.3923-7); R. p. 197 (Welker—Mate Dep., p.59218

—

60:4).

D. The Court should deny the Defendant’s request t0 afﬁrm summary judgment 0n
the basis 0f the messages between Steven Fell and Rachel Welker-Mate.
Steve requested Rachel Welker-Mate

1.

tell

the truth

Defendant has relied upon no Idaho authority in support 0f

its

argument that the Fells

case should be dismissed based on the messages between Steven Fell and Rachel Welker-Mate.

Defendant has relied upon Ramirez
Life Ins., C0.97

plaintiff

Both cases allowed

knew was

false.

v.

T&H Lemont,

for sanctions

Inc.

When

knew

v.

Western

&

Southern

the plaintiff provided testimony that the

worked with

In Ramirez, the plaintiff

deposition testimony t0 events that Ramirez

and Secrease

three witnesses to provide

the Witnesses

had never observed.98 In

Secrease the plaintiff requested the court enforce a phony arbitration agreement.” In both cases,
the courts

awarded sanctions because the

submitted information that they

plaintiffs

knew was

false.100

Unlike Secrease and Ramirez, Mr. Fell never asked Ms. Welker t0 produce false
testimony and he never submitted false testimony. Mr. Fell requested that Ms. Welker testify to
the

same

had told him When Mr.

facts that she

Ms. Welker knew

LaDonna was dangerous

that

came out of the

Fell

hospital

for the speciﬁc reason that

—

particularly that

Ms. Welker saw

LaDonna’s knife 0n the afternoon before the accidentwl Steve did not ask Ms. Welker
did not ask her to fabricate a story.

same consistent
rise t0 the

97

Ramirez

401

v.

(7th Cir.

He

offered

story t0 his attorney that she

same

money

T&H Lemont,

Ramirez, 845 F.3d

at

774-75.

99

Secrease, 800

F3d

at

399.

100

Ramirez, 845 F.3d

101

R. p. 234 (Steve’s Dep., p.55:5-12).

at

is

Ina, 845 F.3d 772 (2016); Secrease

98

776.
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and

lie.

He

t0 tell the

had previously told him. Steve’s conduct does not

level of sanctionable conduct that

2015).

to induce her to tell the truth

to

v.

addressed in Secrease and Ramirez. The

Western

& Southern Life InS.,

C0., 800 F.3d 397,

Court should deny Fat Smitty’s request t0 have motion for summary judgment granted on these
grounds.

II.

CONCLUSION

Pursuant to the foregoing, and the arguments and authority contained in the Appellant’s
brief, the Fells respectfully request the

decision and the award of costs.

The

Court reverse the

district court’s

summary judgment

Fells also request the Court to explicitly adopt the general

foreseeability test discussed in McGill.

DATED this 26th day of November, 2019.
RACINE OLSON, PLLP

Mam
RACHEL A. MILLER

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

HEREBY CERTIFY that 0n the 26th day of November, 2019, a copy 0f the foregoing

was served on
J.

the person(s) listed

below through the iCourt system:

Nick Crawford

jnc@brassey.net

BONNIE K. HILL

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF — Page 26

